Thrasymachus claim that might makes right

If any moron on a street corner could correctly point out the errors being made by bigshot PhDs, why would the PhDs never consider changing?

Thrasymachus claim that might makes right

Indeed, relativism and the moral nihilism with which it is often affiliated, seems to be in retreat everywhere. For many observers and critics, this is a wholly positive development since both have the corrosive effect of undermining ethical certainty.

I think there are two motivations behind this disdain for relativism and moral nihilism: The negative motivation arises from moral dogmatism. There are those who wish to dogmatically assert their own values without worrying that they may not be as universal as one might suppose.

For instance, this is often the case with religious fundamentalists who worry that secular society is increasingly unmoored from proper values and traditions. Ironically, the dark underside of this moral dogmatism is often a relativistic epistemology.

Thrasymachus claim that might makes right

Ethical dogmatists do not want to be confronted with the possibility that it is possible to challenge their values because they often cannot provide good reasons to back them up.

In this work, Bloom argues that American students during the s increasingly bought into multiculturalism, relativism, and a certain cultural nihilism because they did not believe there were any universal values which should be propagated and defended.

Thrasymachus claim that might makes right

As he consistently observed, being critical and reflective about values which are presented as universal is part of the philosophical tradition dating back to Socrates.

What made Bloom unhappy was that these students rejected the whole idea that there could be any universal values. These issues are all of considerable philosophical interest. In what follows, I want to press on just one issue that is often missed in debates between those who believe there are universal values, and those who believe that what is ethically correct is relative to either a culture or to the subjective preference of individuals.

The issue I wish to explore is this: Put more simply, even if we know what it is to be good, why should we bother to be good? This is one of the major questions addressed by what is often called meta-ethics. Sidgwick was not a comprehensive philosopher in the vein of Hume, Kant, and Nietzsche.

Most of what he is remembered for is exclusively in the realm of ethics and meta-ethics. What we needed was something more grounded. As a classical utilitarian, Sidgwick argued that it is happiness that we should take as the motivation for being good.

As Mill had put it earlier, in the absence of God or some more metaphysically abstract concept of intrinsic value, happiness seems like the one thing which any rational person would agree is simply good in itself.

But Sidgwick, as a rigorous analyst always concerned to look at a problem from every angle, quickly surmised that there was a problem. On the one hand, it seemed clear that if happiness was what was intrinsically good, individuals should focus ourselves on impartially maximizing the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.


As he put it late in the book: I obtain the self-evident principle that the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view if I may so of the Universe, than the good of any other … And it is evident to me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally,—so far as it is attainable by my efforts—not merely at a particular part of it.

From these two rational intuitions we may deduce, as a necessary inference … that each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own. But, Sidgwick then observed that this was problematic.

While maximizing happiness impartially seems like the best possible ethical outcome, what might motivate individual actors to put aside their private interests when they conflicted with this impartial goal?

This can be put even more starkly. If we can recognize that our own happiness would mean refraining from impartially making the world better, or even making it worse, why should we feel motivated to try to do good?

Why not do evil if this makes us happy, we can get away with it, and happiness is all the matters to us intrinsically. This problem obviously has special bearing for Utilitarians, since for them happiness is the primary moral concern.

But I also think it weighs heavily on almost any contemporary secular moral theory. This is because each of them emphasizes that human interests, and thus happiness, in some broad sense is the goal of ethics and therefore why we should be good.

Even if we know what is universally ethical and good, why should we care?Thrasymachus thought that "might makes right" because _____.

justice is defined by whoever has the most power To value living an "examined life" assumes that _______. Might makes right, means the bullies of the world rule. The strongest person gets their way.

Want to add to the discussion?

Ring of Gyges. Philosophy, meaning love of wisdom is is the study of knowledge. Socrates has three arguments to employ against Thrasymachus' claim. 1. the view Thrasymachus is advancing promotes injustice as a virtue.

In the discipline of international relations there are contending general theories or theoretical perspectives. Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side.

Aristophanes makes what is the most suggest that this might explain Plato's choice of Thrasymachus as the "combative and bombastic propounder of the 'might is right' theory Socrates counters by forcing him to admit that there is some standard of wise rule — Thrasymachus does claim to be able to teach such a thing — and then arguing.

Or Thrasymachus might have said is that what the rulers call [classify as] justice is really injustice, for although it may benefit the rulers, it harms the ruled. And justice does not do harm.

It is the good for man; it is beneficial to him, not harmful. Callicles and Thrasymachus are the two great exemplars in philosophy of contemptuous challenge to conventional morality.

Both are characters in Platonic dialogues, in the Gorgias and Book I of the Republic respectively; both denounce the virtue of justice, dikaiosunê, as an artificial brake on self-interest, a fraud to be seen through by intelligent people.

Justice is determined by… | Thrasymakos